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This thesis evaluates North Korea’s July 2002 economic reforms. It does so by analyzing 
the content of the reforms, their economic impact on North Korean people, and the 
problem areas of the reforms. This thesis makes five arguments. First, the July 2002 
economic reforms were not intended to reform North Korea’s economic system but to 
provide temporary relief for the regime’s survival. Second, unless the problems in 
monetization and decentralization in the industrial and agricultural sectors are eliminated, 
the economic development effort is doomed to fail. Furthermore, if Pyongyang solves 
international, administrative and infrastructural problems within Special Economic 
Zones, it can spur economic development in the country. Third, the growing economic 
interdependence may help to leverage upon North Korea. Fourth, North Korea’s current 
political system forms the biggest obstacle for present and future reforms. Finally, for the 
U.S. and international sanctions to have more effective impact, there should be a 
consensus on them and the subsiding effect of other countries should be avoided. In 
conclusion, the thesis makes policy recommendations and extracts overall lessons for 
international policy makers, economic leaders, and diplomats that can be applied to this 
and other cases.  
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The main purpose of this thesis is to assess the North Korean 7.1 policy and its 
ramifications and to determine what kind of problems obstructed its success. Northeast 
Asia’s security environment has been volatile, and many incidents have occurred between 
North Korea and neighboring countries. These tensions mostly have been due to military 
conflicts such as naval skirmishes and the nuclear crisis. When someone looks at the 
timing of these tensions, he or she sees that they occur mostly during the most fragile 
moments of the North Korean economy and that North Korea uses these conflicts as a 
tool for bargaining. Therefore, a better understanding of the North Korean economy will 
contribute to estimating future actions and the possible timing of North Korean 
provocations. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Although a cease fire was declared in 1953, North Korea and South Korea still do 
not have a peace agreement. The tension between these two countries affects fundamental 
interests of the region’s four leading countries—People’s Republic of China, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, and Russia. As a result, developments in the North Korea affect not 
only the surrounding countries but also the whole world.  
The more we understand North Korea, the more we can estimate the future 
security environment in Northeast Asia. As the security situation in the Northeast Asia 
affects the balance of power, the future situation in North Korea will have a big effect on 
shaping the future of the world. Therefore, understanding North Korea better will give us 
a better assessment of the world’s future security environment. 
In terms of economics, the most recent series of changes in the North Korean 
economy began with the July 2002 reforms, which have since been called the “7.1 
policy.” The reforms are regarded as having failed overall as there has been no significant 
change in the North Korean economy that can be observed. Moreover, as North Korea is 
an isolated country, available data are scarce about the results of these reforms.  
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Under its new leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea is attempting new ventures in 
economic reform and development, such as establishing new special economic zones 
(SEZ). Whether these new reforms in the economy will be successful is unclear. On the 
other hand, there are contemporary sources of information about the results of 7.1 policy 
and the economic changes that occurred after 2002, especially in the SEZs. To lay out the 
results of the 7.1 policy and the factors that hindered its success will help us to better 
understand whether the recent attempts of Pyongyang have a chance to succeed. 
Consequently, to better judge the 7.1 policy and its results will contribute to a better 
understanding of the further actions of North Korea. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bernhard Seliger’s article “The July 2002 Reforms in North Korea: Liberman 
Style Reforms Or Road to Transformation?” discusses the nature of the July 2002 
reforms and asserts that the July 2002 reforms were rather Liberman-style reforms and 
were not totally radical or intended to change the whole economic system.1 Ihk pyo Hong 
also evaluates the nature of the reforms in his article, “A Shift Toward Capitalism? 
Recent Economic Reforms in North Korea,” as not being intended as a tool of 
transformation.2  
In “North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli (Practical) 
Socialism,’”3 Young Chul Chung supports the argument of these two writers; however, 
he mostly dwells on the hidden ideology of the reforms. Therefore, Chung’s work does 
not offer insight into the content of the reforms, and he rather introduces the ideological 
framework of them. His overall assessments about the ideology of the reforms are hard to 
prove as they are not based on direct confessions of the North Korean leaders.  
                                                 
1 Bernhard Seliger, “The July 2002 Reforms in North Korea: Liberman-Style Reforms or Road to 
Transformation?” North Korean Review 2 (April 2006), 22.   
2 Ihk pyo Hong, “A Shift toward Capitalism? Recent Economic Reforms in North Korea,” East Asian 
Review 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002), 93.   
3 Y. C. Chung, “North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli (Practical) Socialism,’” 
Pacific Affairs 77, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 283.   
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Overall, these sources discuss the pros and cons of the reforms, and all come to 
the same conclusion that these reforms were indeed not intended to create a significant 
change in the current system. These reforms merely create short term solutions to the 
food and currency shortages. 
Ihk pyo Hong also gives insight into the content of the North Korean 2002 
reforms; however, he does not look into all aspects of this content. He only mentions the 
monetization and decentralization aspects of the reforms and does not mention efforts on 
foreign capital acquisition.4  In his article, “Evaluation of the North Korean July 2002 
Economic Reform,” Sung wook Nam gives information about the content of the reform; 
however, he mostly mentions the achievements of the reform and focuses on the changes 
in the monetization, as well as reforms in the agrarian and industrial sector. He does not 
mention the problem areas of these changes in the economy or offer any solutions. 
Moreover, he does not mention the foreign currency acquisition attempts of North 
Korean government as it was not an achievement at the end.5   
Christopher D. Hale, a leading writer on this topic, takes a comprehensive view of 
all the trends of the reforms. He takes the third aspect of the reforms—foreign capital 
acquisition—into account. In “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 
2002 Economic Measures,”6 he combines all aspects of the reform together in an 
academic approach; however, as it was written in 2005, it is far from current. Christopher 
D. Hale offers little analysis of problem areas and or recommendations for further 
improving the North Korean reform attempts.  
Among the writers who examine the third dimension of the reform—foreign 
capital acquisition—are Sung Hoon Lim and Kang Taeg Lim. They give insight into the 
most important part of the foreign capital acquisition trend—special economic zones of  
 
                                                 
4 Hong, “A Shift Towards Capitalism?” 97. 
5 Sung-wook Nam, “Evaluation of the North Korean July 2002 Economic Reform,” North Korean 
Review 3, no. 1 (April 2007), 37.    
6 C. D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 Economic Measures,” 
Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (November–December 2005), 823T. 
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North Korea. They explain the logic behind the development of SEZs in North Korea and 
also offer strategies to develop them in their article “Special Economic Zones as Survival 
Strategy of North Korea.”7  
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland are the most well-known writers on North 
Korea. In their book Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, they 
use the results of the surveys applied in China and South Korea to refugees that fled from 
North Korea. The refugees that they surveyed belong to different levels of society. As 
these refugees fled in different periods of time before and after the 2002 reforms, they are 
a good source to compare the pre and post reform era.  
In their book, Haggard and Noland give detailed information about the results of 
the 2002 reforms. They investigate whether the policy provided more food and whether 
the North Korean people were better off. They compare the answers to these questions at 
each level of society, including farmers, workers at state-owned enterprises, and 
government and political officers, which gives us objective results by which to assess the 
overall implications. They also measure the reforms’ effects on the business environment 
and private farming.   
The book offers us unprecedented information on the results of the 2002 reforms 
given the isolated nature of North Korea. As the writers admit, the results of the survey 
are proportional to the overall North Korean population and might not reflect the effects 
of the reforms accurately in some aspects. In addition, the participants of the China 
Survey are mostly refugees from the northeast part of the country; thus, this might 
negatively skew the results of the polls as this group was discriminated against in initial 
relief efforts.8 Still, the survey results are uniquely the most reliable source of 
information for understanding the “Red Box;” however, the book mostly refers to the 
overall results of the reforms and does not judge each aspect of the reforms separately, 
except for the agricultural ones. 
                                                 
7 Sung-Hoon Lim and Kang-Taeg Lim, “Special Economic Zones as Survival Strategy of North 
Korea,” North Korean Review 2, no. 2 (October 2006), 50–52. 
8 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea 
(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 57. 
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There are scarce sources about the problem areas of the reforms. The literature 
available is mostly about the reasons or results of the reforms. One of the writers who 
mentions the problem areas in monetization and decentralization is Sung Wook Nam. In 
his article, “Evaluation of the North Korean July 2002 Economic Reform,” however, he 
only mentions the problems in monetization.9 Moreover, Ihk Pyo Hong also considers the 
problems in all aspects of reforms; however, he mentions them only superficially.10    
Among the writers mentioned earlier, Sung Hoon Lim and Kang Taeg Lim 
examine the problem areas in the foreign capital acquisition aspect of the reforms. In 
their article, they explain the developmental path of North Korean SEZs. They also 
mention the economic and political effects of the SEZs that are not mentioned in other 
sources.11  
In addition to identifying the problem areas, they also offer recommendations for 
future development of the special economic zones, and thus for the success of foreign 
capital acquisition.12 Sung Hoon Lim offers additional solutions for the success of North 
Korean SEZs in his article, “Seven Business Models for Success of North Korea’s 
Economic Reform.” He suggests seven business models for four North Korean SEZs, 
including the Rajin-Sunbong SEZ, which was established before the 2002 reforms.13  
Robert E. Looney’s article, “Trends: North Korea,” is another useful source to 
understand North Korean economy, the 2002 reforms and the problems behind them. He 
explains the reasons behind the reforms and their similarity with the Chinese model. Then 
he underscores the problems that hindered the further development of 2002 reforms, such 
as the regime’s response to the reforms in 2005 and the currency reform in 2009. He also 
mentions the importance of SEZs as a way of bolstering foreign capital without exposing 
                                                 
9 Nam, “Evaluation of the Reform,” 40. 
10 Hong, “A Shift Towards Capitalism?” 104–106. 
11 Lim, “Special Economic Zones as Survival Strategy of North Korea,” 49. 
12 Ibid., 58–59. 
13 Sung-Hoon Lim, “Seven Business Models for Success of North Korea’s Economic Reform,” North 
Korean Review 6, no. 2 (Fall 2010), 86‒98. 
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its people to Western influences. Namely, he provides an overall understanding of the 
North Korean economy’s past and sheds light on its likelyfuture trends.14 
Hongyi Harry Lai is another writer who contributes to finding solutions for 
special economic zones by comparing the North Korean model with the Chinese 
experience. After laying down the criteria behind the success of Chinese SEZs, he 
especially points out to the administrative problems of the North Korean counterparts and 
takes lessons from the Chinese ones that should be applied to North Korea.15 
Harpal Sandhu is another writer who examines North Korea’s attempts at special 
economic zones, their importance, and their effects on Chinese-North Korea relations. He 
especially mentions the response of the Chinese government to the Sinuiju SEZ and its 
lack of support; thus, he mentions one of the problem areas of North Korean SEZs.16   
Suk Hi Kim and Eul Chul Lim focus on the Kaesong SEZ and offer insight into 
its rather successful story among North Korean SEZs; however, they point  to its 
uncertain future and mention the possible friction points that hinder the development of 
the Kaesong SEZ.17 He concludes by suggesting reasons for a positive development in 
inter-Korean relations; however, as the article was written in 2009, some of the prospects 
that he suggested did not come to pass as we have seen recent developments in inter-
Korean relations. 
Darren Z. Cook’s article “Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market 
Economy,” is one of the contemporary sources on North Korean special economic zones. 
He gives overall information about all SEZs in North Korea and points out the problem 
areas within them. He also recommends solutions for the future prosperity and 
development of these zones. He especially focuses on the judicial aspect of the problems 
                                                 
14 Robert E. Looney, “Trends: North Korea,” The Milken Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2010), 
5‒13. 
15 Hongyi Harry Lai, “SEZs and Foreign Investment in China: Experience and Lessons for North 
Korean Development,” Asian Perspective 30, no. 3 (2006), 70–96. 
16 Harpal Sandhu, “A Doomed Reform,” Harvard International Review 25, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 36–
39. 
17 Suk Hi Kim and Eul-Chul Lim, “The Kaesong Inter-Korean Industrial Complex Perspectives and 
Prospects,” North Korean Review 5, no. 2 (Fall 2009), 81–91. 
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and lays out the difficulties of the economic environment in the SEZs in the absence of 
legal guarantees.18   
In accordance with the political problems that hindered foreign capital 
acquisition, Jon M. Van Dyke’s article explains the naval skirmishes between North and 
South Korea in his article, “The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow 
(West) Sea.”19 Moreover, Yu Hwan Koh gives a chronological summary of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis and the response of South Korea in his article, “Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administration’s North Korea Policy and Nuclear Crisis Management.”20 These two 
articles, of course, are not enough to cover all the political problems and their impacts on 
foreign capital acquisition. 
Robert I. Rotberg’s When States Fail: Causes and Consequences is one of the 
leading books about the lessons to be learned from the past experiences of nation states.21 
He offers overall lessons that can also be considered for the North Korean case. James 
Dobbins’ book The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building is another source that 
introduces lessons that can be applied to the North Korean economy. His book is also 
useful to derive lessons from other countries’ experiences in economic reform.22  
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity and Poverty is another source that offers advice on how North Korean 
economic institutions should look. They compare poor and rich countries and examine 
the differences between them; thus, they draw lessons for North Korea if it wants to 
prosper.23  Thomas L. Friedman’s The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First 
                                                 
18 Darren C. Zook, “Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market Economy,” Stanford 
Journal of International Law 48, no. 1 (Winter 2012), 1–25. 
19 Jon M. Van Dyke and others, “The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) 
Sea,” Marine Policy 27, no. 2 (2003), 143.  
20 Yu-hwan Koh, “Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s North Korea Policy and Nuclear Crisis 
Management,” Korea and World Affairs 30, no. 1 (2006), 5.  
21 Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
22 James Dobbins, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National 
Security Research Division, 2007). 
23 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 420. 
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Century is a good source to understand why the presence of foreign investment in North 
Korea would contribute to the world peace. His book underscores the importance of 
North Korea’s foreign capital acquisition effort and the interdependent relationship it 
would create, which might be a future deterrent for North Korea in its international 
relations.24 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
This thesis intends to answer four main questions. First, what are the trends of the 
July 2002 reforms? Second, what are the economic impacts of these reforms on North 
Korean people? Third, what are the problems that affected these reforms? Fourth, what 
are the impacts of politics on the reforms?  
E. MAJOR ARGUMENTS 
The writer argues that the 7.1 policy was not intended to reform the whole 
economy, but to offer temporary recovery for the North Korean situation. Unless the 
problems in monetization and decentralization in industrial and agricultural sectors are 
eliminated, the economic measures are doomed to fail. Furthermore, there is little chance 
for foreign capital acquisition of special economic zones unless international, 
administrative and infrastructural problems are solved. On the other hand, the growing 
economic interdependence of North and South Korea may offer some leverage in 
diplomatic negotiations; however, North Korea’s current political system forms the 
biggest obstacle for present and future reforms. Finally, for international sanctions to 
have more impact, there should be a consensus on them within the international 
community and participating nations must continue to uphold these sanctions vigorously. 
In conclusion, the thesis makes policy recommendations and extracts overall lessons that 
can be applied to other cases. 
                                                 
24 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 1st Picador, 
Further updated and expanded, Pbk. ed. (New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 660. 
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F. METHODOLOGY 
The basic analytical method used in this thesis is a case study approach. The 
writer uses North Korea’s economy as the main focus. At the end of the thesis, the writer 
includes the lessons learned that can be extracted from such a case study and that can be 
applied for other case studies.  
In some parts of the thesis, the writer refers to the Chinese economy and its 
development process as North Korean ventures were affected by its biggest comrade. 
Those parts of the thesis offer a comparative study. This comparison focuses on the 
special economic zones of North Korea. Here, the writer wants to find out why Chinese 
SEZs matured whereas North Korean ones are still under developed.  
The thesis performs no statistical analysis, but nevertheless uses statistical data to 
show the effects of the economic reforms. Here, the writer uses recently revealed sources 
about the development of the reforms. The writer also uses the previously mentioned 
refugee surveys and their assessments about the reform movements. 
The thesis also includes historical study to look into the political aspect of the 
reforms and find out the political events that effected North Korean economic reforms. 
The writer briefly looks into the political effects of these historical events. These 
incidents are mostly the well-known conflicts, such as naval skirmishes and the nuclear 
crises between North Korea and other countries.  
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II. THE TRENDS OF THE 7.1 POLICY 
A. BACKGROUND 
North Korea is one of the few countries having both exclusive political 
institutions and exclusive economic institutions at the same time, similar to China before 
economic reforms.25 After the suspension of energy delivery by the Soviet Union after its 
collapse in 1991, North Korea was deprived of one of its comrades.26 The subsequent 
severe famine in the 1990s which resulted in the deaths of several million people out of 
22 million was the best indicator that the already crippled economy had hit bottom.27 
That was when Pyongyang introduced the 7.1 policy. 
On July 1, 2002, North Korea introduced the 7.1 policy. Pyongyang named the 
policy the “economic adjustment package.”28 The aim was to improve economic 
conditions, not to transform North Korea into a market economy. North Korean officials 
described the approach as “silli (practical) socialism”29 which allowed more incentives 
for an improved economy within the current ideological system. This kind of approach 
resembled the Chinese reforms implemented in 1978; however, Pyongyang’s intention 
was to focus on the inefficiencies within the system and eliminate them. 
These measures can be classified into three trends: monetization, decentralization, 
and foreign capital acquisition. Monetization and decentralization are domestic reforms 
aiming to stimulate the food supply, transition control over economic sectors from black 
markets to the state, and channel state’s spending to other areas by abolishing state 
subsidization in certain areas. Foreign capital acquisition followed two trends and was  
 
 
                                                 
25 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, 420.   
26 Seliger, “The July 2002 Reforms in North Korea: Liberman-Style Reforms or Road to 
Transformation?” 22.         
27 Marcus Noland, “Famine and Reform in North Korea,” Asian Economic Papers 3, no. 2 
(Spring/Summer 2004), 20.      
28 Hong, “A Shift toward Capitalism? Recent Economic Reforms in North Korea,” 93.      
29 Chung, “North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli (Practical) Socialism,’” 283.   
 12 
intended to cover the severe capital shortage necessary for domestic market and industrial 
development such as building infrastructure.30 These trends are examined in more detail 
in the following sections. 
B. MONETIZATION 
1. Price Increases 
The most significant aspect of the July 2002 reforms was the monetization trend. 
This trend was composed of price reforms and marketization. Before July 2002 money 
was not able to perform its crucial role in the monetary system. The public distribution 
system (PDS) was in practice; therefore, even when a citizen had money, he or she could 
not buy a desired quantity of goods. Besides, the prices were not formed according to the 
real cost of production, but according to the cost of raw materials used in production.31 
To balance the price gap between general markets and national stores and to 
reflect the actual production costs, Pyongyang increased the official sale prices of rice. 
As shown in Table 1, the sale price of one kilogram of rice increased from 0.08 won to 44 
won.32 
On the basis of rice prices, Pyongyang also set new prices for other goods, such as 
corn, diesel oil, electricity, streetcar fares, subway fares, train fares, entrance fees and 
rents; however, these new prices were not proportional with the increase in the cost of 
rice as shown in Table 2.33 While health care and education remained free, Pyongyang 
stopped supplying subsidies for housing.34 So, as the price of electricity went up, the 
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2. Wage Increases 
While increasing the prices, Pyongyang also increased wages. Monthly wages 
rose around 20 fold from 110 won to 2000 won. The bulk of the increase in wages was 
for soldiers and farmers. Wage increases for military personnel were due to the seongun 
(Military first) policy of North Korea. The procurement price for agricultural products 
was also increased by the government to make farmers produce more for the PDS. Before 
the reform, the government was paying 0.8 won for rice and selling it for 0.08 won. Thus, 
the government was taking a loss by this trade. After the reform, the government 
procured rice for 40 won and sold it to the people for 44 won. Different from the previous 
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3. Devaluation of the Won 
Beside price and wage increases, Pyongyang introduced another aspect of price 
reform: devaluation of the won. One U.S. dollar was worth to 2.15 won before reform; 
the government readjusted its exchange value rose to 150 won per dollar. Later, the 
official rate went up to 900 won per dollar.36 
                                                 
36 Ibid.,” 41. 
 15 
C. DECENTRALIZATION 
The second aspect of 7.1 policy was decentralization. Decentralization happened 
in two sectors: industrial and agricultural. 
1. Industrial Decentralization 
The first phase of industrial decentralization included the closure of all nonprofit 
factories, one of which was a major glass factory. In this phase, the government was 
trying to improve efficiency within the system.37 The goal of the second phase was to 
reduce unnecessary administrative layers, such as party members, from factories. The 
only party representative that remained at the factories was the party secretary.38 The 
most significant difference after July 2002 was that factories were held responsible for 
covering their costs. The government ceased providing subsidies to factories, so factories 
were supposed to pay the wages of their employees. This system was called the self-
support accounting system.39 According to the self-support accounting system, managers 
were also supposed to purchase their own raw material.40  
To raise capital for the infrastructure of factories, the government issued 
“People’s Life Bonds.” Net amount of gain was not determined by the government, and 
full trust to government was expected. According to the state newspaper Rodong 
Shinmun (Workers’ Newspaper), the government built eight power plants with the money 
raised by bonds.41 
The government also freed enterprises to invest as they wanted. In addition, 
factories were allowed to hire and fire workers. Managers were also free to give bonuses 
to the workers they wanted. With this incentive, the government aimed at performance-
based distribution.42 The motive was to push factories to come up with new strategies to 
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enable more production and to foster the invention of new tactics to make a profit.43 As 
Deng Xiaoping asserted, “It doesn’t matter whether it’s a white cat or a black, I think; a 
cat that catches mice is a good cat.”44 Pyongyang thought the same. 
2. Agricultural Decentralization 
The other aspect of decentralization happened in agriculture. After July 2002, 
instead of giving food subsidies to everybody, the government provided only a basic 
supply of grain as needed by issuing ration coupons. After the end of the drought, grain 
production increased by 8 %.45 This created over confidence in Pyongyang that the PDS 
system could be sustained and even get more reinforced. This kind of approach needed 
more grain for the PDS system. By raising procurement prices, Pyongyang expected to 
create an incentive for farmers to produce and supply more grain to the PDS system.46  
Another aspect of agricultural reforms was a pilot land-lease program in 
Heoryong and Musan located in Hamgyeong province. People are allowed to perform 
private farming in this part of the country by using the leased land that had been 
previously used for collective farming. These areas were established before 2002; the 
plots were limited to 30 pyong (118 square yards).47 After the July 2002 reforms, the 
government increased it to 400 pyong (1579 square yards). Farmers also received capital 
for fertilizer and farming tools.48 The government also allowed them to take all of the 
output and sell it on the market. This incentive led to three-fold higher production than in 
the state-owned farms.49 
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D. FOREIGN CAPITAL ACQUISITION 
The third aspect of the 7.1 policy and the most important venture of the 
government was foreign capital acquisition. The first phase of this venture was the 
devaluation of dollar as mentioned earlier. The government’s next incentive for foreign 
investment was “scrapping the use of foreign exchange coupons for foreigners, allowing 
foreign nationals to use the same currency as North Korean nationals.”50 As shown in 
Figure 1, the next and most significant incentive was the establishment of “special open-
door areas.”51 These areas are mostly referred to as special economic zones (SEZ). In 
addition to the Rason special economic zone established before 2002, the government 
founded the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region (SAR), the Mount (Mt.) Kumgang 
Tourism Zone, and the Kaesong Industrial Park.52 The Sinuiju SAR, which was 
established in September 2002, is on the Chinese border. This SEZ was aimed to focus on 
trade with countries on the Yellow Sea.53 Mt. Kumgang SEZ was established in 
November 2002 on the east coast of North Korea.54 It was planned as an international 
touristic attraction, especially for the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan.55 The 
Kaesong SEZ was established by a joint venture between North Korea and South Korean 
Hyundai Assan on June 2003, one year after the reforms.56 It was established in the city 
of Kaesong in North Korea, which is only 60 kilometers away from Seoul, the capital of 
South Korea.57  
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Figure 1.  North Korean Special Economic Zones (from Lim, 49). 
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III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 7.1 POLICY 
A. BACKGROUND 
North Korea represents a highly information-constrained environment. Thus, the 
most important way to get information in societies such as North Korea is through 
surveys. This method has also been applied in closed societies such as the Soviet Union 
and China. Here, also, the most reliable information about the impacts of the 7.1 policy 
can be found in the surveys of North Korean refugees fleeing to other countries. There are 
two major surveys that have been conducted until now: China and South Korea surveys. 
The primary goal of these surveys was to evaluate the overall impact of reforms.58 The 
first question on these surveys was: “Has food availability improved in North Korea?”59 
The results were surprising; despite the reforms, as shown in Figure 2, almost 75 
percent of the refugees expressed that they disagreed or totally disagreed that the food 
availability had increased. They suggested that the reforms had not provided a better 
supply of goods.60 
The next major question was: “Did you become better off?”61  
As shown in Figure 3, few thought that the situation got better, whereas a majority 
of the refugees disagreed or totally disagreed that they got better off. The percentage that 
agreed that they were better off was mostly ex-party officials or farmers.  
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Figure 2.  China Survey Response to “Has food availability improved in North Korea?” 
(from Haggard and Noland, 66). 
 




B. THE EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE 
When asked whether the agricultural policies had any effect, the answer differed 
among refugees who were farmers, workers and party officers. 
Table 3.   Pre- and Post-reform Perceptions of Agricultural Policies: South Korea 
Survey (from Haggard and Noland, 69). 
 
 
As seen in the Table 3, 17.7% of farmer refugees admitted that they had “more 
opportunity to trade farm products on the market after reform,”62 which is higher than 
4.7% for the pre-reform era.63 This increase is due to the “shift in the terms of trade in 
favor of agriculture.”64  
According to the results, the cooperative or farm had more control over planting 
decisions, and there was greater availability of inputs, such as fertilizer. Moreover, the 
farmers had more access to land to grow what they wanted. Furthermore, they had more 
opportunity to trade farm products on the market. However, the government or 
cooperative managers seemed to take more and more grain from the cooperative each 
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year. Also, the other problem was the unsustainability of the government. The bulk of the 
people surveyed admitted that the government changed the rules more often. The 
percentage of the people who thought like this went up to 64.7 percent for the post-
reform era, whereas the number was 40 percent for the pre-reform era.65 Therefore, there 
is a small but positive change in terms of agriculture. This is one of the rare positive 
results of the 2002 reforms. In terms of providing space for trading products, the July 
2002 reforms made a contribution to the farmers.  
C. THE EFFECTS ON STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
As shown in Table 4, dissatisfaction increases to 79.2 % for post-reform era, 
which was 76.1 percent for the pre-reform era among the other refugees such as workers 
in rural areas and state-owned enterprises (SOE). Different from the results of the poll on 
agricultural reforms, even the workers in rural areas and state-owned enterprises, who 
enjoyed a privileged position in North Korea, were not satisfied with the reforms, and 
eight workers out of ten denied that they were better off.66 
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Table 4.   Pre- and Post-reform Perceptions of State-owned Enterprise Reforms:  
South Korea Survey (from Haggard and Noland, 71). 
 
 
The participants stated that less of their enterprise’s output was sold on the 
market, and more of their work was done outside the enterprise in the post-reform era. 
They also claimed that people did not seem to work as hard for the work unit as in the 
past. On the other side, participants declared that their factory was involved in market 
activities outside the plan less than before. Compared with the pre reform era, an 
increasing number of participants confirmed that the quality of social services at their 
work unit declined.67 
D. THE EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICERS 
According to the results of the poll applied to the government and party officer 
refugees shown in Table 5, 19.2 % of party officer refugees suggested that they were 
better off after reforms, which is a higher percentage compared with the 16.7 % rate 
before reforms.68 
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Table 5.   Government and Party Officers’ Perceptions of Reform Trends: South 
Korea Survey (from Haggard and Noland, 72). 
 
 
Fewer people agreed that more effort was devoted to ideological and propaganda 
work and they also did not agree that corruption among public officials increased. On the 
other hand, they agreed that their office devoted more time to money-making activities 
not directly related to their official or traditional responsibilities; however, they did not 
agree that their office competed against other government/party organizations in money-
making activities. They concluded by admitting that the government changed the rules 
more often.69 
E. THE EFFECTS ON BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND PRIVATE 
TRADING 
According to the surveys (see Figure 4) applied to North Korean refugees who 
fled country at least one year after the reform, 30% of respondents claimed that the 
government controlled the prices in the reform era, whereas the percentage dropped to 
around 15% in the post-reform era.  




Figure 4.  Perceptions of the Business Environment for Market and Private Activities: 
South Korea Survey (from Haggard and Noland, 67). 
There was also an increasing percentage in respondents stating that they were 
unable to trade in legal (general) markets. Figure 4 indicates a significant increase in 
black market activities.  
  
Figure 5.  Ease of Engaging in Private Trading in North Korea: South Korea Survey 
(from Haggard and Noland, 67). 
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According to the respondents as shown in Figure 5, the ease in private trading for 
the post-reform period went up to 39.8 % from the rate of 32.2 for the pre-reform era; 
however, 80% of respondents, which was 65 % in the pre-reform era—Figure 4—
admitted that they had to pay bribes to engage in private activity.70 The survey results 
among the refugees from Hamgyeong province, where North Korean authorities initiated 
a pilot private farming program, had more positive assessments about the post-reform era 
than the others. They evaluated that there was an improvement in well-being and that the 
emergence of the markets has functioned as a “safety valve.”71 
According to the results of the South Korea survey, most of the refugees 
concluded that “merit was not awarded and working hard at your assigned job didn’t 
yield fruit.”72 As shown in Figure 6, working at an assigned job was not thought to be the 
ideal way to behave after the reforms. Moreover, the percentage seeing the market 
activities as an easy way to earn money also dropped after the reforms. On the other 
hand, more people thought that engaging in corrupt or criminal activities was an easier 
way to earn money.73  
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Figure 6.  Easiest Way to Make Money in North Korea: South Korea Survey (from 
Haggard and Noland, 67). 
Most of them believed that reforms supported marketization; however, almost all 
of the refugees emphasized growth in inequality (84%), materialism (92%), and 
corruption (89%).74 The survey indicates that the monetization reforms did not actually 
improve the lives of North Koreans. Only the party officers were more satisfied with the 
results of the reforms. At first glance, this can be attributed to the 7.1 policy; however, 
increase in corruption suggests that the satisfaction of party officers may not only be due 
to the 7.1 policy.  
The decentralization in the industrial sector does not seem to have any effect. As 
the survey suggests, the only perceived improvement is the opportunity to trade farm 
products on the market. That can be attributed to the 7.1 policy; however the increase in 
gains of farmers is not only due to general markets but also due to the expansion of the 
black market. So, the only direct impact of the 7.1 policy on the agricultural sector can be 
attributed to the Hamgyeong private farming venture. The overall satisfaction among 
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farmer refugees from Hamgyeong suggests that it was successful. The third aspect of the 
reforms, foreign capital acquisition, does not seem to have any direct effect on the North 






IV. PROBLEMS THAT AFFECTED THE 7.1 POLICY 
A. PROBLEMS IN MONETIZATION 
The North Korean government’s monetization measures did not yield the 
expected results. For example, the government could not achieve a profit from the 
procurement and sale of rice as there was a high motivation for corruption among 
government officials. Rice prices went up to 250 won on the black market, which was 
higher than the official procurement price of 40 won. Thus, selling it on the black market 
instead provided more profit for the farmers. The price increases which formed the first 
phase of the reform were similar to the start of the Chinese reforms in 1979. The key 
difference, however, was that in North Korea price rationalization was under national 
control.75 
The main reason that monetization could not succeed, though, was that the food 
and commodity production could not catch up with the demand. Lack of supply, too 
many won bills, and ongoing demand all contributed to the resulting hyperinflation.76 As 
the state did not respond quickly by designating new procurement and sale prices, a large 
gap between official and black market prices reappeared. The victims hardest hit by 
hyperinflation were people receiving wages from state or industrial enterprises. They 
went on receiving the same basic salary, which was 2000 per month.77 Even so, the 
government could not pay the full amount of wages. To sustain their lives, these workers 
had to do additional jobs.78 
B. PROBLEMS IN DECENTRALIZATION 
1. Problems in Industrial Decentralization 
The 7.1 policy’s industrial incentives were proper; however there were other 
problems. There was a severe lack of raw materials. Even steel factories were in quest of 
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scrap iron; therefore, managers who were supposed to procure their own raw material 
were helpless. Combined with the energy shortages caused by the lack of energy 
infrastructure, factories ended up with a 30% operational efficiency rate on average.79 As 
a result, although the enterprises were allowed to invest freely, they were out of capital to 
do so. 
2. Problems in Agricultural Decentralization 
The incentives in agriculture also did not lead to the fully anticipated growth 
level. One of the reasons for this shortfall was that the government did not adapt the grain 
procurement prices according to the rate of inflation. While grain prices were going up on 
the black market, state procurement prices stayed the same. The government could not 
compensate for the increasing procurement prices for grain, because it lacked the capital 
for it. As farmers were free to keep a certain amount of their harvest after meeting 
production targets and to sell the production surplus, they preferred to sell their surplus of 
production on the black market.80 
C. PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN CAPITAL ACQUISITION 
Foreign capital acquisition by SEZs did not work out for North Korea either. The 
special economic zones could not provide Pyongyang the necessary capital for its 
investments. The problems in SEZs can be categorized into three groups: international, 
administrative, and infrastructural. 
1. International Problems 
The most significant international problem was customs clearance.81 The first 
aspect of customs clearance is strict control over production and export of weapons. Most 
of the industrial production, which was 18% of whole GDP, was military production.82  
The control on weapons production hampered military exports. The second customs 
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clearance problem was international competition. The products from Kaesong have 
“Made in Kaesong” or “Made in DPRK” labels on them. This label does not attract 
customers in terms of origin. Also, the tariff rate was very high for North Korean 
products. While the tariff rate for Chinese products was between 4.2 and 27.8 percent, the 
tariff rate for North Korean products was between 45 and 90 percent. High tariff rates did 
not allow competitiveness for North Korean products in international markets.83 
Another international problem that hindered the development of SEZs was the 
Chinese government’s lack of support. North Korea did not acknowledge the Chinese 
government about its special economic zone venture. China was especially uneasy about 
the Sinuiju special economic zone. As Dandong City is located across from Sinuiju City 
and connected to it by a bridge, the Chinese government worried that the residents would 
rush Sinuiju to gamble.84  
2. Administrative Problems 
The second part of disappointing results of the reforms was administrative 
problems. Pyongyang assigned Yang Bin, who was being investigated for commercial 
fraud by China, as the chief executive of the SEZ. The Chinese government later arrested 
him leaving the SEZ without an authority.85 The subsequent authorities who replaced 
him were not open-minded and innovative. In China, during the initial establishment of 
the SEZ, Liang Xiang became the Mayor of the Shenzhen SEZ. He fought with 
corruption and recruited the most talented people in the region using head hunters.86 
North Korean SEZs never had such a leader. The administration also lacked the full 
authority to establish authority free from Pyongyang. Basic law clearly stated that SEZs 
were “under the central authority of the State.” The SEZs did not have a special body like 
the Special Economic Zones Affairs Office as in China to communicate directly between 
                                                 
83 Lim, “Seven Business Models for Success of North Korea’s Economic Reform,” 92.    
84 Sandhu, “A Doomed Reform,” 39.    
85 Lai, “SEZs and Foreign Investment in China,” 90. 
86 Ibid., 78–81. 
 32 
the SEZ authority and the government, and to streamline the administrative approval 
procedures for foreign investments.  
Another aspect of the administrative problems was the fragility of legal 
guarantees.87 Legal guarantees were too fragile to build a secure environment for 
investment. According to the law, Pyongyang reserved the right to station military 
personnel in the SEZs. Depending on the international political tensions, trade procedures 
changed all the time. Judicial processes were the same for SEZs as they were in the other 
regions of North Korea. Thus, the SEZs lacked an economic law.88 
3. Infrastructural Problems 
Infrastructural problems were the third part of the problem for SEZs. The main 
hindrance with infrastructure was lack of investment. Comparing North Korean SEZs 
with their role model, China, Shenzhen has spent 4500 million Renminbi (RMB) for its 
infrastructure.89 There are no available data on how much money North Korea has spent 
on infrastructure; however, industries producing too much wastewater and consuming too 
much electricity were not allowed in North Korean SEZs, which means infrastructure 
was not adequate.90 
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V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE REFORMS 
After the July 2002 reforms, there were important political events that affected the 
implementation of the reforms. The first one was the 2002 nuclear crisis, which took 
place only four months after the policy was introduced. Four years later, the 2006 nuclear 
and missile crisis followed. Also, the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong incidents took place 
after the failed 2009 currency reform attempts. The last of these incidents, the nuclear 
crisis, occurred in 2013. While these incidents were happening, there was also domestic 
politics going on. This chapter is dedicated to finding out the effects of each of these 
factors on the 7.1 policy. 
A. 2002 NUCLEAR CRISIS 
In October 2002—four months after the establishment of the 7.1 policy—North 
Korea acknowledged that it had been conducting a nuclear program. In doing so, North 
Korea nullified its 1994 agreement with the United States. Following this open 
admittance of a nuclear program, North Korea started to harvest plutonium from the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex. These incidents created a nuclear crisis between North 
Korea and the international community.  
The crisis had no effect on the monetization and decentralization trends of the 
July 2002 economic reforms. It partially affected the foreign capital acquisition trend of 
2002 reforms. This negative effect mostly originated from the sharp decline in trade with 
Japan.91 Moreover, Japan’s North Korea policy shifted from default engagement to 
default containment. As a result, Japan started to implement sanctions on North Korea. 
By February 2004, these sanctions first started with the tightening of procedures for the 
reporting of remittances and continued as total cessation of trade and stoppage of food aid  
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by the end of the year.92 These sanctions affected the foreign capital acquisition trend of 
the 7.1 policy as pro-North Korean residents in Japan are one of the major sources of 
hard currency for North Korea.93 
Another side effect of the nuclear crisis was U.S. sanctions. In 2003, President 
George W. Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Nonetheless, this 
was only a weak call for cooperation to monitor possible WMD (weapons of mass 
destruction) carrying ships.94 More important than that were fiscal measures taken by the 
U.S. Treasury Department. It threatened to stop business with any banks helping North 
Korea’s transactions. And it did so. On September 15, 2005 the U.S. Treasury announced 
that Macao-based Banco Delta Asia had suspicious ties with Kim Jong-il. Following this, 
Banco Delta froze $25 million of North Korean funds. Other banks around the world also 
cut their ties with North Korea “for fears that the United States might retaliate.” This 
affected North Korea’s foreign bank accounts; however, they were not significant in the 
long term.95 Another target of the U.S. Treasury was foreign firms cooperating with 
North Korea. Swiss Kohas AS was one of them. The U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions 
against it suspecting it of being a “technology broker” for the North Korean military by 
proliferating “goods with weapons-related applications.”96 
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Figure 7.  North Korean Trade with the World vs. the Middle East (from Haggard and 
Noland, 554). 
U.S. sanctions also affected the infrastructural development of the Kaesong SEZ. 
It did not allow the installation of a direct telecommunications connection between North 
and South until November 2005 due to concerns over dual-use technologies. This 
prevented direct calls from North to South and disabled Internet connection for a while; 
however, this sanction did not affect North Koreans directly. Rather, it impacted the 
South Koreans who were trying to do business with North Korea. This period of isolation 
even helped North Korea to control the flow of information in and out of the Kaesong 
SEZ easier.97 
U.S. sanctions to bring down the regime had short-term effects but not long-term 
results. They were rare and targeted only specific goods. It had a limited effect that 
resulted with North Korea’s diverting of its economic activities rather than suspending its 
total trade. As U.S. sanctions were unilateral, they were replaced by other U.S. rival 
suppliers.98 China was a major supplier, but it had its own reasons. First, it wanted to 
                                                 
97 Frank, “The Political Economy of Sanctions,” 28. 
98 Ibid., 30. 
 36 
increase its influence on North Korea and gain leverage against the United States. 
Second, it wanted to open up new markets in which to direct its production surpluses. 
Third, the improved economic conditions backed up by the Chinese government’s 
guarantee attracted Chinese entrepreneurs. Low labor costs in North Korea SEZs were 
another factor for this attraction.99  
In addition to China, there were other countries benefiting from a growing trade 
with North Korea. These were developing Middle East countries—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, 
and Lebanon, as shown in Figure 7. “Trade with Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon has 
grown twice as fast as North Korea’s trade with the rest of the world.” Furthermore, 
North Korea exported to Thailand, Brazil, Qatar, Myanmar, France, Germany, and 
Nigeria as shown in Figure 8. On the other hand, North Korean received imports from 
Thailand, Russia, Brazil, India, Netherlands, and Congo.100 
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Figure 8.  North Korea’s Top Ten Trading Partners, 2004–2007 (%) (from Haggard 
and Noland, 553). 
Overall, the 2002 nuclear crisis did not directly affect the monetization and 
decentralization trends of the July 2002 reforms, but it did have some partial effects on 
the foreign acquisition trend of the reforms. The most important effect of the sanctions by 
the United States was on North Korea’s future prospect for trade and the future of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex.101 If the Japanese embargo and U.S. sanctions were not 
unilateral and the trade gap had not been subsidized by other countries, this would have 
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had a more significant effect on North Korean SEZs and foreign capital acquisition in the 
end. It is also why North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to developing weapons of 
mass destruction after the crisis and even during the Six-Party Talks.102 
B. 2006 MISSILE AND NUCLEAR CRISIS 
On July 5, 2006, North Korea fired seven missiles over the East Sea. The 
Taepodong-2 model missiles exploded soon after they were launched. On October 8, 
2006, it made its first nuclear test exploding a sub-kiloton bomb. There were new 
sanctions following the incident. To start with, Japan introduced sanctions on Chosen 
Soren—the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. It removed tax 
exemptions for the association, which meant lesser hard currency revenue for North 
Korea.103 While Japan accounted for 3% of North Korea’s imports and 11% of its 
exports, trade dropped to a trickle by 2007.104  
At the same time, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) implemented 
trade sanctions on major weapons systems and luxury goods. Another resolution 
(UNSCR 1874) on June 12, 2009 extended the scope of the sanctions adding all arms-
related trade and all training or assistance to it. The latter resolution helped to prevent the 
collaboration among North Korea, Iran, and Syria on missile and nuclear technologies; 
however, these resolutions did not include a trade embargo, and it excluded nonmilitary 
commercial trade. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance and support for 
denuclearization went on after the sanctions. The United States went on introducing trade 
sanctions; however, these modest restrictions (reconfirmed in June 2009, by the Obama 
administration) did not have that much of an effect as the trade with North Korea was so 
small.105 
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Figure 9.  China’s Trade with North Korea (from Haggard and Noland, 556). 
The effective part of UN and U.S. sanctions was their financial side. The UNSC 
explicitly provided legal ground for implementing financial means to block WMD-related 
trade. This constituted blocking of transfers and freezing of the assets related to North 
Korea’s weapons activities and even included nonweapons-related activities depending 
on the interpretation of the resolution. Likewise, the U.S. Treasury’s firm stance against 
any institutions flirting with North Korea continued and provided a useful leverage for 
the United States during Six Party Talks.106 
The sanctions after the 2006 nuclear crisis increased North Korea’s dependence 
on China as shown in Figure 9. Despite an interruption in trade after the missile crisis, 
there is a sharp increase in North Korea’s export to China after the nuclear crisis due to 
pressure on North Korea for foreign capital acquisition that was needed for imports. By 
2007, North Korea’s export to China accounted for 27.9% of total exports, whereas North 
Korea’s import from China was 32.9% among all imports. The acceptance of the UN  
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resolution was a clear sign of China’s disaffection with North Korea’s behavior. 
Moreover, the periodic decrease between January 2007 and March 2007 is another sign 
of dissatisfaction. 
Nonetheless, this did not mean the abandoning of China’s goals mentioned above. 
That was also why China showed reluctance to implement more aggressive actions 
against North Korea. In fact, Premier Wen Jiabao promised more economic support to 
North Korea. Overall, China had its own reasons to follow economic engagement with 
North Korea.107 
In addition to trade with China, the subsidizing effect of trade with other countries 
went on. These were again developing Middle East countries—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, 
and Lebanon. Besides, North Korea exported to Thailand, Brazil, Myanmar, Venezuela, 
India, and Netherlands. On the other hand, North Korean imports were from Thailand, 
Russia, Brazil, India, Congo, and South Africa. Furthermore, a remarkable contribution 
was made by the Egyptian telecommunication company Orascom with a $500 million 
investment in North Korea.108 
The UN sanctions in 2006 had little impact on inter-Korean engagement until 
2009 as shown in Figure 10. The inter-Korean economic relation was disrupted by the 
missile and nuclear crisis; however, it continued as it was intended for political and 
humanitarian interests. Total trade in 2008 reached $1.8 billion. The overall revenue from 
the Kaesong and Mount Kumgang initiatives between 2005—the actual date that 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) started exports—and 2008 reached a total of $1.7 
billion.109   
The interruption in trade took place from 2006 until the Six Party Talks in 2007 
despite the Roh administration’s sympathy for engagement. Starting from the October 
2007 summit, the two Koreas embarked on new economic cooperation projects; however, 
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after the election of Lee Myung-bak, there was a rather conditional approach. He spared 
$1.2 billion for economic cooperation for 2009 but did not spend the money because of 
the worsening relations. As the Mt. Kumgang Tourism zone and KIC had substantial 
noncommercial government subsidies in addition to those from private companies, these 
noncommercial subsidies were subject to political changes. Under the Lee administration, 
the share of the noncommercial firms has decreased given the conditional concept of 
engagement.  
 
Figure 10.  South Korea’s Trade with North Korea (from Haggard and Noland, 559). 
During the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, economic 
engagement was seen as a tool to direct North Korea into reform. The confined nature of 
the activity to specific regions was the proof of its political face. Therefore, the Roh 
administration held this test separate from international politics. The Lee administration’s 
policies followed the same path with a difference of their conditional nature.110  
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To sum up, the 2006 missile and nuclear crises had effects on North Korean 
economic changes after the 2002 reforms. The direct effects were on foreign capital 
acquisition rather than on monetization and decentralization. The changes in 
monetization and decentralization trends were due to internal dynamics that will be 
mentioned in the next section in detail; they were not directly related to international 
environment. The effects of UN and U.S. financial sanctions on the foreign capital 
acquisition trend were more than the trade sanctions; however, the subsidizing trade with 
other countries ameliorated their severity. Except for their interruption after the missile 
and nuclear crises, North Korea’s economic engagement with South Korea and China 
continued. It was by the Lee administration’s conditional approach that there was a 
decrease in investment in the KIC and Mt. Kumgang initiative.   
C. 2009 CURRENCY REFORM 
As another attempt to recentralize the economy and clear away the negative 
effects of the July 2002 monetization reforms, the North Korean regime announced 
currency reforms on November 30, 2009. The reasons for the reform was to curb inflation 
by decreasing the amount of currency, prevent any further workers abandoning their jobs 
to participate in private market activities, and stop individuals and companies from 
hoarding the foreign currency they had acquired. The aim was to diminish the excess 
money that was causing inflation, to increase the work force, and to increase the state 
budget to enable more imports to meet the demand.111 
This was another attempt to rebuild central authority over the economy.112 The 
2008 New Year’s Joint editorial was the sign of measures to bring back the centralized 
economy:  
The socialist economy is a planned economy, which can be rapidly 
developed only when its superiority is adhered to and unreservedly 
displayed. For this reason, this year’s joint editorial importantly stressed 
the issue of strengthening the planned discipline in all sectors and all units 
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of the people’s economy. In order to brilliantly realize the grand goal of 
building an economically powerful state presented by the party, all 
functionaries and working people must cherish the superiority of the 
socialist planned economy as their firm faith and put great strength into 
displaying it highly.113 
Currency reforms are applied all over the world; however, Pyongyang’s currency 
reform was different from the conventional case.114 There were three elements of the 
reform:  
1. Exchanging currency bills for new ones at the rate of 100 to one 
with a limit of 100,000 North Korean Won in old bills per 
household,  
2. For workers, maintaining salaries at old currency levels and thus 
producing a 100-fold raise in income,  
3. Completely banning transactions done in foreign currency.115 
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Figure 11.  Rising Costs in North Korea (from Noland, 2). 
Until that time, the government saw the prices as the fundamental problem, 
whereas the low food supply was the problem. That was why the government saw the 
revaluation of won as a solution. By the announcement, people started to buy foreign 
currency on the black market and physical goods to maintain their money’s value. This 
caused the drop of the won’s value.116 The exchange rate climbed higher to 500–600 won 
per dollar.117 To prevent this, the government banned the use of the foreign currency. 
This was followed by the announcement of official prices for a variety of goods and 
limits in the opening hours of the markets. The costs rose dramatically as shown in Figure 
11.118  
As a result of a general dissatisfaction, there was civil upheaval and even physical 
attacks on security forces that were trying to implement the reforms. As a result of the 
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aggression, the government took a step back and increased the exchange rate to 150,000 
won in cash and 300,000 in bank savings.119 Moreover, Pyongyang eased the conditions 
of the reforms by offering wage compensation and allowing the use of foreign currency 
again.120 Kim Jong-il also executed Park Nam-ki—Director of Planning and Finance—as 
a scapegoat for the failed reform attempts.121  
In terms of the rivalry between the cabinet and the party on the economy, the 
currency reform failure highlighted the cabinet. The failure was such a disgrace for the 
regime that the currency reform was not mentioned in the 2010 New Year’s Day joint 
editorial. What was mentioned instead was foreign trade as a way of expanding the 
supplies of food and goods, because the party had realized that the expansion of foreign 
capital acquisition was important to be able to centralize the economy. According to 
party’s new way of thinking, expanding foreign currency reserves would increase the 
ability to import more. If the state could increase the food supply by imports and 
distribute the imported goods via government channels, this would revive the public 
distribution system.122 
The government had become aware that if they wanted to strengthen the public 
distribution system, they should first achieve an adequate inventory of food and goods at 
their state-run stores. This was also one of the complaints related to currency reform. 
During the reform, food merchants had stockpiled food instead of selling it, which 
created a low supply of foods and caused prices to skyrocket.123 
As a result of the party’s eagerness to continue foreign capital acquisition, it did 
not try to curtail the activities of the special economic zones after 2010; however, 
Pyongyang’s current aim is not to open up to the world again, but to achieve the 
centralization of the trade and foreign currency management systems. With a dominant 
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public distribution system, the government expects business activities in the black market 
to shift to the state-run stores. As a result of centralization, Pyongyang expects a virtual 
cycle of normalization. Overall, the currency reform failed to centralize the economy; its 
results acted as an incentive for foreign capital acquisition.124  
D. DOMESTIC POLITICS IMPACTING ECONOMIC REFORMS 
North Korea has never had the goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous” 
nation.125 It is a monolithic system formed around one individual called Suryong. There 
is a Cabinet and a Party under Suryong. These components are supposed to act as one 
body according to the Suryong’s guidelines. As a back-up force for the monolithic 
system, North Korea adapted the concept of Juche. The term means main body or subject 
and means independent stand and the spirit of self-reliance. It first originated from the 
rejection of the de-Stalinization policy in the mid-1950s. Kim Il-sung outlined its three 
principles during his speech in 1965: self-defense in national defense (jawi), 
independence in politics (jajoo), and self-sustenance in the economy (jarip). Namely, the 
state should be self-sufficient in defense and the economy, and also should present its 
will in politics freely.126 
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Table 6.   Military Spending, Selected Countries (from Seliger, 135). 
 
 
In 1992, the regime got rid of the last remnants of Marxism in the Juche idea and 
evolved it into a religious/ethical system. This also strengthened the legitimacy of the 
hereditary system of power transition. As a result of the Juche system, North Korea 
followed economic strategies to achieve a self-reliant state.127  
Within this system, the regime saw military activities not as a resource absorber, 
but as a resource generator. Therefore, Pyongyang gave priority to the national defense 
(jawi) and established a military-first politics (songun chongchi).128 This notion is a 
slogan for a military state where politics, international relations, and even the economy 
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Table 7.   Active-duty Military Personnel, Selected Countries (from Seliger, 136). 
 
 




As a result, Pyongyang spends roughly 30% of its GDP on the military as shown 
in Table 6. This amounts to $5 billion as shown in Table 8. Moreover, North Korea has 
1,106,000 active-duty troops, which accounts for 5% of its population, as shown in Table 
7.130 The regime’s emphasis on songun chongchi can clearly be seen in its own official 
analysis on March 2003: “During the Arduous March in our history, great Comrade Kim 
Jong-il firmly believed that the destiny of the people and the future of the revolution 
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hinged on the barrel of a gun, and that we could break through the difficulties and lead 
the revolution to victory only by depending on the Army… Once we lay the foundations 
for a powerful self-sustaining national defense industry, we will be able to rejuvenate all 
economic fields, to include light industry and agriculture and enhance the quality of the 
people’s lives.”131 
The rise of the songun chongchi in 2003 was an explicit sign of regime’s strong 
desire to preserve the existing system, rather than reform it. The other way around would 
be unthinkable where the economy has consequently been considered secondary. The 
July reforms were also only short-term measures to cope with the economic crisis, not to 
change the economic system. The country needed a desperate remedy at that time.132  
The search for the necessary remedy for the failing economy was the start of the 
ongoing conflict between the cabinet and the party. The cabinet’s assessments during the 
economic crisis showed that marketization was more beneficial for the country than the 
party’s socialist vision. The cabinet formulated the marketization program and introduced 
it as Korean-style socialism. The party saw the cabinet’s proposal as a risk to the socialist 
system and the state; however, Kim approved the execution of the cabinet’s economic 
policy. Kim’s visit to Southern China was the key to his pragmatic approach and 
approval of the cabinet’s proposal because his observations during this trip noted the 
dreadful difference between two countries that was hard to ignore. The cabinet was the 
winner of the debate with the party; however, the party was not hiding its disaffection 
with the economic agenda.133 The most distinct example could be seen in the party’s 
lecture notes which were published soon after the July 2002 reforms:  
Through economic change and personnel interchange programs too, the 
imperialists are pushing the infiltration…The capitalist’s ideological and 
cultural infiltration will never cease, and the struggle against it will 
continue, as long as the imperialists continue to exist in the world…The 
great leader, Kim Jong-il, pointed out the following: “Today, the 
imperialist and reactionaries are tenaciously scheming to blow the wind of 
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bourgeois liberalism into us.”…People will ideologically degenerate and 
weaken; cracks will develop in our socialist ideological position; and, in 
the end, our socialism will helplessly collapse. A case in point is the bitter 
lesson drawn from the miserable situations of the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries.134 
The party’s advocacy to abandon the July 2002 economic conditions went on. Its 
main objection was about the decentralization trend. Therefore, it started to emphasize 
centralization through its statements: “If a country wants to develop and be strong, it 
should be politically stable and its society should be united…Unity is a root of socialism, 
and the power of ideology eventually comes out of the power of unity that firmly 
solidifies all the people as one under the column of the Party and the leader.”135 There 
was also emphasis on the Juche idea and military-first politics, which undermined the 
economic reforms: “All functionaries should display all the more higher the revolutionary 
trait of unconditionally implementing the party policy to the end…The party line and 
policy are filled with fighting tasks and methods and strategy and tactics for embodying 
the Juche idea and the military-first idea in all areas of revolution and construction.”136  
As a result of party’s dissatisfaction with the reform policy, the party assigned 
Park Nam-ki as economic policy director of the Korean Workers’ Party and tried to 
revive the policy in 2005 and end the capitalist fantasy. To form a centralized economy 
again, the party tried to revive the public distribution system and prevent private farming. 
The party tried to balance the demand for and supply of grain. Nonetheless, these efforts 
to revise the 2002 reforms had limited success.137 
According to the results of the refugee survey that was conducted in South Korea, 
there was a growth in ease of engaging in private farming. It rose from 39.8% in the 
reform era (2002–2005) to 42.4% in the retrenchment era (after 2005); however there was 
a decrease in the ability to trade in legal markets. It rose from 50% in the reform era to 
55% in the retrenchment era. On the other hand, there was a high decrease in the 
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government officials’ ability to control the prices. It dropped from 35% in the reform era 
to 20%. Incidentally, there was an increase in the bribes and the frequency of changing 
rules in the market activities that correlated with the evolution of these policies. As the 
results indicate, the party was not successful in bringing back the centralized socialist 
system. It had nothing to do but to freeze its efforts to quit the 2002 reforms until the 
wake of the nuclear crisis in 2006.138  
The 2005 attempts were another proof of the halfhearted nature of the July 2002 
reforms.139 But the 2005 attempts were meant mostly to stop the decentralization trend of 
the 2002 reforms. The trade in special economic zones continued and reached a total of 
$1 billion by the end of 2005. By 2005, KIC exported its first products—stainless steel 
pots. A total of 4100 North Korean workers from 15 South Korean companies were 
operating by the end of 2005. Also, Mt. Kumgang was a tourist attraction point with its 
golf courses, restaurants, and hotels. It hosted half a million tourists by the end of the 
year.140 
After the nuclear test, the souring relations with South Korea after the Lee 
administration and the disaffection of China and temporary interruption of the economic 
engagement with China once again harmed the cabinet’s argument and strengthened the 
party’s hand.141 Backed up by the 2008 New Year’s editorial, the party rejected any 
further attempts to reform the North Korean economy, whereas the cabinet continued to 
timidly demonstrate the benefits of cooperation with other countries.142     
Pyongyang was also discontent with the Lee administration of South Korea’s 
conditional approach: “economic reform maneuvers of the Lee Myung-bak gang for 
opening up the North are an attempt to degenerate our system and to absorb our Republic 
into their liberal democratic system and thus will unfailingly bring nothing but North-
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South confrontation and war.”143 As a result of the dissatisfaction with the post-Lee era, 
North Korea tried to use the KIC and Mt. Kumgang as reverse leverage. It stopped train 
operations to these areas and ceased tourism activities in Mt. Kumgang. Moreover, 
Pyongyang suspended the activities of an economic cooperation office, and demanded 
that the South decrease its staff of the KIC Management Committee by half. These 
actions were followed by North Korea’s harsher environmental standards and fines for 
violations within the KIC in March 2009. There was even a period of temporary 
shutdown of the KIC during that month. By May, North Korea announced that the 
existing contracts were void.144  
The party’s attitude on KIC and Mt. Kumgang was another clear manifestation of 
its priority on politics, not on the economy. It preferred to sacrifice economic gains to 
obtain political power. This attitude was also proven in its decline of the U.S. food aid 
program negotiated in 2008.145 Therefore, the party’s dissatisfaction with the cabinet’s 
policy showed itself in the shape of political actions. The party tried to prevent the 
decentralization effects of the July 2002 reforms. Although the party could not reverse 
the changes that came along with the reforms, the party did not allow new marketization 
efforts of the cabinet either. On the other hand, the cooperation in KIC and Mt. Kumgang 
took place under closer inspection by Pyongyang and was in a more limited nature 
compared with the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administration era.146  
After the 2009 currency reform, the North Korean regime has been more aware of 
the importance of the foreign capital acquisition trend of the July 2002 reforms.147 
Politics are still a priority as the Cheonan attack on March 26, 2010 and the 
bombardment of Yeongpyeong on November 23, 2010 prove; however, there is more 
interest in foreign investment in special economic zones.148 The increasing trade volume 
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after these incidents is clear proof of this interest. In 2011, trade in the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex rose by 24%. This shows how important foreign investment is for both North 
and South Korea.149 
The North Korean regime’s growing focus on foreign investment can also be seen 
in its actions between 2010 and 2011: 
• Pyongyang established a State Development Bank in March 2010 to 
provide investment in major projects and “will have advanced banking 
rules and system for transactions with international monetary 
organizations and commercial banks;”150 
• Pyongyang also established The Joint Venture and Investment 
Commission in July 2010 to oversee approvals of foreign invested 
projects; 
• The government announced a ten-year economic development plan in 
early 2011; 
• The regime increased education activities for officials who are in charge 
of foreign investment including an informal tour of the U.S. economy in 
March 2011—the first time in North Korea’s history.151 
The 2013 nuclear crisis is the last of North Korea’s attempts to show that politics 
are its first priority. What it will bring for North Korea’s economy is unclear for now. 
The inauguration of Park Geun-hye as President of South Korea on February 2013 is 
another factor impacting the future of inter-Korean economic relations. Her trustpolitik—
a tough line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations at 
other times—will affect the future of North Korea’s strategy.152 Nonetheless, as trade in 
the KIC after the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong incidents shows, Chinese investment in 
Korea is less vulnerable to crises. The recent economic attempts in North Korea also 
show its growing interest in foreign investment. Therefore, trade in the KIC looks 
promising for both sides. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 7.1 POLICY 
1. Recommendations on Monetization 
In order to enhance monetization trends of the 7.1 policy, North Korea should 
refrain from trying to change prices and wages according to a schedule. It should 
recognize market prices and should apply price liberalization as China did.153 
Inflationary movements should be mitigated by banking system. According to the 
surveys, wage increases as a part of the monetization trend tended to favor soldiers and 
party officials; therefore, to satisfy the needs of the other workers, the government should 
have a more balanced approach. 
2. Recommendations on Decentralization 
a. Recommendations on Industrial Decentralization 
To enhance the industrial sector, the government should modernize 
infrastructure and provide capital to the factories. That is also the solution for 
infrastructural problems within the SEZs that will be mentioned in detail in the next 
section. With the provided capital, factories can procure raw material. In order to raise 
this capital, Pyongyang must abandon its military-first politics and adopt economy-first 
politics. The government should decrease the military budget and allocate it for 
infrastructure and industry.154 
b. Recommendations on Agricultural Decentralization 
In order to enhance the agricultural sector, the government should 
recognize market prices for grain. To stimulate efficiency in agriculture, private farming 
should be continued and encouraged to spread. Furthermore, the current system of 
                                                 
153 V. F. S. Sit, “The Special Economic Zones of China—A New Type of Export Processing Zone,” 
Developing Economies 23, no. 1 (March 1985), 81.    
154 Seliger, “The July 2002 Reforms,” 30.  
 56 
working squads comprised of 25 people should be transformed into family-based farming 
to increase efficiency in farming as in the Chinese reform.155 
c. Recommendations on Foreign Capital Acquisition 
In order to enable foreign capital acquisition through SEZs, North Korea 
should leave brinksmanship diplomacy and cease creating international tensions such as 
the nuclear crisis. This is one of the differences between North Korean and Chinese 
SEZs. During the economic reforms, China followed peaceful diplomacy. If North Korea 
follows such a path in its international relations, North Korea’s unfavorable image can 
change, and this change can lead to the decrease in the tariff rates; thus, North Korean 
and SEZ products can enjoy competitive prices in international markets.156 New leaders 
can be an opportunity for both sides to open a new page in international relations. 
In order to solve related administrative problems, Pyongyang should 
designate experienced, liberal, and technocratic leaders to inspire and pioneer the 
economic change within the SEZs. Furthermore, Pyongyang should form an 
administrative law that allows an autonomous management for SEZs allowing a secure 
environment for investment. Also, to enable legal guarantees, to clarify trade procedures, 
and to resolve jurisdiction problems, a special economic law for SEZs should be 
established. 
B. SUMMARY OF BROADER LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
The North Korean 7.1 policy gives invaluable lessons about the ineffective 
reconstruction of a ruined economy. The most significant lesson of all is the rule of 
reducing the risk of resumed conflict.157 The ongoing naval skirmish and nuclear crises 
have indicated a possibility of a war, thus hampering the economic efforts of the 7.1 
policy. Removing or diminishing the risk of resumed conflict is one of the prerequisites. 
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The second lesson focuses on the rule of law.158 The absence of administrative 
and economic law was one of the biggest problems that obstructed the development of 
special economic zones and blocked the flow of severely needed capital.159 As the SEZs 
could not provide the capital, other reforms were deprived of the essential ingredient of 
their practice. Thus, countries should establish the rule of law. 
The third lesson concerns the elimination of price controls.160 To create 
development, a government should create an environment conducive to trade. One of the 
conditions for such an environment is to remove governmental controls on prices. That is 
how China managed to achieve an economic reform in the 1980s. Therefore, 
governments should eliminate price controls to enable economic development. 
The fourth lesson focuses on building infrastructure. North Korea did not have the 
adequate infrastructure for growth. Pyongyang should have created a secure economic 
environment and channeled some of the funds spent on military into improving 
infrastructure. Thus, building infrastructure is one of the most important ingredients of 
development.161 
The last and most important lesson is that the cookie cutter approaches do not end 
with the same results. Chinese reforms ended up being a great success story and led 
China to be the second biggest economy in the world. In China’s case, agriculture was 
the pioneer for reform. 63% of the population was in agriculture in 1980, whereas it is 
only 20% of the population in North Korea during 7.1 policy.162 So, the measures did not 
yield to the same results as in the Chinese example. As China’s Foreign Minister once 
told, “We have followed a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Such a road is 
not necessarily suited to other countries’ conditions.”163 Therefore, a cookie-cutter 
approach may not be the exact solution for other countries. 
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C. SUMMARY OF JUDGMENTS 
Reforms in North Korea do not resemble the kind of reforms in China.164 In 
North Korea, reforms are not intended to fundamentally change the economic system, 
rather only to make a partial improvement of the economic mechanism. There are still 
unfinished reforms in the monetary, industrial, and agricultural fields. If Pyongyang 
solves international, administrative, and infrastructural problems within the SEZs, this 
can lead to an economic development in the country. 
As discussed earlier, the 2002 nuclear crisis had an indirect effect on the 
monetization and decentralization trends of the July 2002 reforms. Its effects were rather 
in the foreign acquisition trend of the July 2002 reforms. On the other hand, the 2006 
missile and nuclear crisis had direct effects on foreign capital acquisition. Except for their 
interruption after the missile and nuclear crisis, North Korea’s economic engagement 
with South Korea and China continued through the KIC and Mt. Kumgang initiative, but 
entered a cautious phase after the Lee administration’s conditional approach.  
The 2009 currency reform was the last blunder to overturn the decentralization 
effects of the July 2002 reforms. Nonetheless, it helped to make the party realize the 
importance of the capital acquisition trend of the July 2002 reforms. Therefore, the 
further cooperation in North Korean special economic zones looks promising for the 
good of North Korea and stability on the peninsula. Among all these initiatives, the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex looks the most promising. The continuing economic 
engagement during and after the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong incidents is clear sign of the 
importance of economic engagement for North and South Korea. This is a good example 
that growing economic interdependence may help to leverage upon North Korea.  
As already noted, the July 2002 economic reforms were not intended to reform 
North Korea’s economic system as a whole, but to provide temporary relief for the 
regime’s survival. Even so, the relief that resulted from these reforms has been limited. 
The July 2002 monetization efforts have not worked so far. The decentralization trends 
had partial success and helped to promote private farming and markets for trading goods. 
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The real problem underlying their limited success was North Korea’s domestic politics 
and the competing views on reforms shared by the party and the cabinet. The emphasis 
on military-first politics after 2003 was a clear manifestation of the halfhearted nature of 
the reforms. The closure of the KIC on March 2009 and the rejection of U.S. food aid 
were also explicit indicators of North Korea’s priority on politics rather than the 
economy, let alone reforming the system. Even after the failure of the 2009 currency 
reform effort, there have been signs of emphasis on economy; however, these attempts 
are only for bringing back a more centralized economy. Therefore, North Korea’s current 
political system poses the most significant obstacle for present and future reforms. To 
provide real economic development as in China, North Korea should have leaders who 
believe in a market economy.   
For the sanctions to have more effective implementation impact, they must have a 
consensus and the subsiding influence of other countries should be avoided. China is the 
most influential country among all. Given China’s core political goals, it was impossible 
to reach such a consensus; however, China’s dissatisfaction after the 2013 nuclear crisis 
may have a different effect on the future of sanctions’ implementation power. 
Nonetheless, more effective than the sanctions would be increased trade and investment 
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